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INTRODUCTION
This is an unusual case. It began as an ordinary wrongful discharge case involving
two Amalgamated Sugar employees who worked and were fired (for excessive
absenteeism) in Twin Falls, Idaho. Amalgamated Sugar produced documents, answered
interrogatories, and took plaintiffs' depositions. Plaintiffs took no depositions. Two
years after the complaint was filed, Amalgamated Sugar filed for summary judgment on
the grounds that plaintiffs' public policy claim based on Utah law should be dismissed
because Idaho law controlled, that plaintiffs' other claims failed under Idaho law, and
that some of plaintiffs' claims were preempted by federal labor law. The court granted
summary judgment, but permitted plaintiffs to amend their complaint to assert a public
policy wrongful discharge claim under Idaho law. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint,
and Amalgamated Sugar moved to have it summarily dismissed on the grounds that
plaintiffs' public policy claim failed under Idaho law and was preempted by federal labor
law. The court granted summary judgment, dismissing plaintiffs' final claim.
Plaintiffs reacted to the court's decision by moving to disqualify Judge Taylor for
bias and seeking sanctions against defense counsel. Plaintiffs referred to Judge Taylor as
"The Biased," and accused him of "be[ing] ignorant of fundamental distinctions,"
"embrac[ing] Mr. Gavre's half-witted lies in his stupor of gratuitous ignorance,"
"instruct[ing] Mr. Gavre to continue lying and misrepresenting facts to him," relying on
"whatever passed for his 'reasoning,'" "refus[ing] to divulge his lack of legal
justification," "acting... as a sycophantic co-counsel for the defense" and issuing an
"obsequious award of a dismissal to the defense."
387115.1

R. 1207-08, 1213-14.

Plaintiffs

accused defense counsel of "pervasive dishonesty and/or ineptitude/' "ignoranfce] of
fundamental legal principles/' and of "urging Judge Taylor to presume the invalidity of
the basic legal principles." R.1214.
After defense counsel responded to the motion for sanctions, plaintiffs filed a
second motion for sanctions as well as a complaint with the Utah State Bar. Judge West
of the Second Judicial District Court found plaintiffs' motion to disqualify Judge Taylor
to be without merit: "Plaintiffs simply disagree with Judge Taylor's prior ruling and have
expressed their displeasure in an extremely harsh, vindictive and unprofessionally written
Motion." R. 1276; also R. 1365-66. The Utah State Bar dismissed plaintiffs' complaint,
and Judge Taylor denied plaintiffs' two motions for sanctions. R. 1396.
On appeal plaintiffs ignore the fact that they are seeking review of summary
judgment decisions, and recite "facts" taken solely from their complaint. PL.Brief at 612. l They disregard their deposition testimony, even when it contradicts allegations in
the complaint. The relevant facts are those that were presented to the district court in
connection with summary judgment and in compliance with Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-50 l(2)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
Because plaintiffs "rest upon the mere allegations . . . of [their] pleading" and for other
reasons, they fail to show that the district court committed any error in summarily
dismissing their claims.

Brief of Plaintiffs Blake William Waddoups and James Edward Sparrow, Jr. is herein
referred to as "PL Brief at ."
387115.1
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Amalgamated Sugar accepts plaintiffs' statement of issues except as noted herein.
Plaintiffs' third issue—"Are litigants and courts bound by the Code of Judicial
Administration?"—appears to be purely rhetorical, and there is no argument in plaintiffs'
Brief devoted to it. PL Brief at 2.
Plaintiffs' last argument is that the court did not allow them sufficient time to
conduct discovery before granting summary judgment. PI. Brief at 50. This is not one of
the "Issues Presented For Review." PI. Brief at 1-4. The district court denied plaintiffs'
Motion for Continuance in a Ruling dated August 12, 1998 (R. 993), and plaintiffs did
not appeal the Ruling. The standard of review for a denial of a motion for a continuance
is abuse of discretion. Crossland Savings v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Plaintiffs worked at Amalgamated Sugar's sugar factory in Twin Falls, Idaho.
Their employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement between their
union and the company.
absenteeism.

They were separately discharged in 1995 for excessive

Plaintiffs allege that they were fired for

6t

threaten[ing] to 'blow the

whistle'" on the company's supposed shipment of contaminated sugar. PI. Brief at 12.
Ignoring the grievance and arbitration procedure under their labor agreement, plaintiffs
387115.1
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filed suit asserting claims for: (1) public policy wrongful discharge under Utah law,
(2) intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress, (3) interference with prospective
economic advantage, (4) conspiracy, and (5) punitive damages. R. 1-15. Judge Taylor
dismissed plaintiffs' claims at summary judgment, but allowed them to replead their
public policy claim under Idaho Law.

In a second summaiy judgment decision,

plaintiffs' last claim was dismissed.
B.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Court

Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed on October 11, 1995. R. 1. Amalgamated Sugar
filed for summary judgment on November 5, 1997. R. 319. On April 7, 1998, the
District Court granted summary judgment, but gave plaintiffs leave to file an amended
complaint asserting a public policy wrongful discharge claim under Idaho law. R. 918.
On August 18, 1998, the District Court denied plaintiffs' motion for a continuance.
R. 993. On December 8, 1998, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint. R. 996. On
January 6, 1999, Amalgamated Sugar filed its motion to dismiss plaintiffs' public policy
wrongful discharge claim under Idaho law. R. 1019-53. On April 8, 1999, the District
Court orally dismissed plaintiffs' final claim. Because of the delay caused by plaintiffs'
efforts to disqualify Judge Taylor, the order dismissing plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
was not signed until May 15,2000. R. 1391-93.

387115.1
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C.

Statement of Facts

The following facts were presented to the district court in connection with
Amalgamated Sugar's two summary judgment motions. R. 326-31, 543-45, 550-51, 55354, and 1030-38 (Addendum C, E, H).2
Facts Material to Plaintiffs' Employment
1.

Amalgamated Sugar hired Blake Waddoups ("Waddoups") in 1985 and

James Sparrow ("Sparrow") in 1989 to work at the Company's sugar manufacturing
facility in Twin Falls, Idaho. Complaintffif8,10 (R. 3)3.
2.

"Plaintiffs, Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow, at all times material hereto

worked and resided in the County of Twin Falls, State of Idaho." Complaint ^ 7 (R. 3).
3.

Plaintiffs' employment with Amalgamated Sugar was governed by a

collective bargaining agreement between The American Federation of Grain Millers
Union ("the Union") and the Company, and both plaintiffs were members of the Union.
Plaintiffs received copies of the collective bargaining agreement. Deposition of James E.
Sparrow, Jr. at 28-29 (hereinafter "Sparrow Depo. at

") (Add. A); Deposition of Blake

William Waddoups at 95-96 (hereinafter "Waddoups Depo. at _ " ) (Add. B).
4.

Under the collective bargaining agreement, employees may be discharged

only for "just cause," and a discharged employee may file a grievance if he believes that

2

Those portions of plaintiffs' depositions and exhibits relied on (Addendum A and B
hereto) were filed with the district court as Appendices. Initially the Record contained
only the table of contents of the first Appendix filed. R. 525-27. The two Appendices
are now included in the Record at R. 1405 and 1406, but are not individually paginated.
Plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint are identical except for the addition of
the term "Idaho" to several paragraphs of the latter. R. 1-17, 996-1015.
387115.1
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his discharge was not justified. The grievance process culminates in binding arbitration.
The collective bargaining agreement states:
The Company has the right to discipline or discharge
employees for just cause.... An employee who believes his
discipline or discharge is not justified shall have recourse to
the grievance procedure under the Agreement.... An
employee claiming a grievance shall put his grievance in
writing to his Steward within five (5) scheduled working days
of the Employee's knowledge of the occurrence to be
grieved.... Time is of the essence and all grievances must be
handled within the prescribed time limits set forth herein.
Failure to do so shall constitute forfeitures of the written
grievance by either party failing to do s o . . . . If a grievance is
to be carried to arbitration,... [the arbitrator's] decision shall
be final and binding on all parties involved.
Ex. 4, at pp. 4-5, to Sparrow Depo.; Ex. 9, at pp. 4-5, to Waddoups Depo. (Add. A, B).
5.

Plaintiffs' employment was subject to the rule that "The maximum number

of unexcused absences you can receive before being terminated is three (3)." Ex. 3 to
Sparrow Depo. (Add. A). Plaintiffs were familiar with this rule. Waddoups called it a "3
strikes [and] your [sic] out" rule. Ex. 2 to Waddoups Depo. (Add. B). Sparrow testified:
Q.

Do you recall being informed of the rule that you
could have no more than three unexcused absences?

A.

Yes.

Q.

When do you recall being informed of that rule?

A.

All the t i m e . . . . [P]eople were always talking about it,
you know, foremen, supervisors.

Sparrow Depo. at 27-28 (Add. A).

387115 1
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Facts Material to Sparrow's Unexcused Absences
6.

Sparrow had unexcused absences on September 10, 1994 and March 25,

1995. Sparrow Depo. at 201-03 and Ex. 7, at pp. 1-2, thereto (Add. A).
7.

On May 20, 1995, Sparrow did not report to work, but called in sick.

Sparrow explained:
A.

I just—it was just nerves in my stomach. I just felt
really queasy and I just didn't feel like going to work
mostly. It was just the place had gotten to me and I
just didn't feel like being there.

Q.

So you called in sick?

A.

Yes.

Sparrow Depo. at 210 (emphasis added) (Add. A).
8.

On the afternoon of the same day, Sparrow went to Nevada and was caught

speeding. Because he had an outstanding warrant for a prior unpaid speeding ticket,
Sparrow was arrested and not released from jail until May 25, 1995. He missed work on
May 20, 21, 23, and 24, 1995. Sparrow Depo. at 211-16 (Add. A).
9.

Sparrow knew that his absences were unexcused and that he had exceeded

the maximum number permitted. When he returned to Twin Falls, Sparrow telephoned
his foreman and asked him if he was fired:

387115 1

Q.

Why did you ask him if you were fired?

A.

Because I spent three days in jail and I should have
worked. I work Friday. I missed three days of work.
That's unexcused. Plus I knew I had one before and
that's four, and I knew I could be terminated for that.

Q.

You knew you could be terminated for unexcused
absences and you had enough to be terminated?
7

A.

Yeah.

Sparrow Depo. at 217 (Add. A).
10.

Sparrow was discharged on May 22, 1995 by Assistant Superintendent Bill

Stuart for having more than three unexcused absences. Sparrow Depo. at 219 (Add. A).
11.

Sparrow alleges that he was discharged "without just cause" and without

being given an "opportunity to respond or be heard on the purported basis [of his
discharge] that he had abused his sick leave." Complaintfflf39, 37 (R. 10).
12.

Sparrow did not file a giievance under the collective bargaining agreement

regarding his discharge. Sparrow testified:
Q.

Did you know that an employee who is discharged
who does not think it's fair or justified can have a
grievance filed?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You knew you could file a grievance upon being
discharged?

A.

Yes.
***

Q.

When you got fired did you file a grievance with the
union?

A.

No.

Sparrow Depo. at 43,175 (Add. A).
Facts Material to Waddoups' Unexcused Absences
13.

On October 10, 1986, Waddoups received a written warning for missing

work. Ex. 10 to Waddoups Depo. (Add. B).

387115 1
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14.

Waddoups had an unexcused absence on March 19, 1988.

Waddoups

Depo. at 113 and Ex. 12 thereto (Add. B).
15.

On September 28 and December 28, 1993, Waddoups was warned about

his poor attendance. Waddoups Depo. at 118-19 and Exs. 15 and 17 thereto (Add. B).
16.

On June 29, 1994, Waddoups had an unexcused absence. Waddoups Depo.

at 123 and Ex. 18 thereto (Add. B).
17.

On March 3, 1995, Waddoups had an unexcused absence.

Waddoups

Depo. at 243 and Ex. 23 thereto (Add. B).
18.

On May 28, 1995, Waddoups did not report to work. At 10:00 a.m., four

hours after his work shift had begun, Waddoups called in saying he was sick. Waddoups
then spoke to Assistant Superintendent Larry Dayley, and gave him a different
explanation: "I told him that I had personal problems. I didn't know why the alarm
didn't go off, but I had over slept. I had called in sick because I wasn't feeling well."
Waddoups Depo. at 258, 260-61 and Ex. 26 thereto (Add. B). In his application for
unemployment benefits, Waddoups stated that he was discharged because "[he] was late
and had been warned." Ex. 2 at p. 1 to Waddoups Depo. (Add. B).
19.

Assistant Superintendent Larry Dayley terminated Waddoups for excessive

absenteeism. Waddoups Depo. at 22-23 and Ex. 2, at p.l, thereto (Add. B).
20.

Waddoups alleges that he was discharged "without just cause" and without

being given an "opportunity to respond or be heard on the purported basis [of his
discharge] that he had been tardy too often." Complaintffl[39, 35 (R. 10, 9).

387115.1
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21.

Waddoups did not file a grievance under the collective bargaining

agreement regarding his discharge although he was aware of the grievance process.
Waddoups Depo. at 98, 107 (Add. B).
Fact Material to Plaintiffs' Whistleblowing Claim
22.

On February 16, 1995, there was an accident at Amalgamated Sugar's Twin

Falls facility in which employee Mike Davis was killed while cleaning a sugar conveyor
system. The facility was shut down and cleaned for three days after the accident. Sugar
that was being loaded on the day of the accident was subsequently shipped to an animal
feed producer (and not for human consumption). Complaintfflf15, 22; Sparrow Depo. at
64,126-27 and Ex. 6 thereto; Ex. 22 to Waddoups Depo. (Add. A, B).
23.

Plaintiffs claim that sugar stored at the Twin Falls facility was

contaminated by the fatal accident, and was subsequently shipped to customers for
human consumption, a criminal violation of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.
Complaint f 44 (R. 11); Sparrow Depo. at 46-7 (Add. A).
24.

Plaintiffs claim that they

6<

threaten[ed] to expose the [Company's] illegal

activity" of shipping supposedly contaminated sugar. Complaint f 40 (R. 10). However,
neither plaintiff ever contacted the Food and Drug Administration, any federal authority,
any state authority, or the media about the Company's supposed shipping of
contaminated sugar. Sparrow Depo. at 173-74; Waddoups Depo. at 65 (Add. A, B);
Complaint 1m 23-44 (R. 6-11).
25.

Sparrow testified that he never raised with anyone the issue of supposedly

contaminated sugar being shipped:
387115.1
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Q.

[A]t any time after the Mike Davis accident, did you
bring up any concern you had about possibly
contaminated sugar?

A.

No.

Q.

You never brought it up to anyone?

A.

No.

Q.

So with respect to Mike Davis's death, did you raise
any issue of contamination with anyone?

A.

No.

Sparrow Depo. at 172,173-74 (Add. A).
26.

On May 31, 1995, after they had been discharged, plaintiffs returned to

Amalgamated Sugar's Twin Falls facility to pick up their personal belongings.
Waddoups got into an argument with plant manager Vic Jaro about supposed sugar
contamination. Sparrow Depo. at 145-47 (Add. A). Waddoups testified:
Q.

Were you saying you were thinking of going to the
news or to the FDA?

A.

I never said that.

Waddoups Depo. at 65 (Add. B).
27.

Plaintiffs were "bulk loaders," responsible for loading sugar in rail cars.

They had no responsibility to determine the purity of sugar, and did not certify or in any
way validate the condition of the sugar. They did not determine where the sugar was
shipped or whether it was intended for human or animal consumption or any other use.
Plaintiffs merely loaded rail cars with sugar and filled out bulk loading forms indicating
that the cars were loaded and that the car openings were closed and sealed. Waddoups
387115.1
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Depo. At 87-88, 135-37 and Ex. 21 Ihereto; Sparrow Depo. At 177-79, 183-84, 186-91
and Exhibits 5-6 thereto (Add. B, A). Sparrow testified:
Q.

[D]id you ever tell anyone at Amalgamated that you
did not want to sign off on shipments of adulterated
sugar?

A.

No.
***

Q.

So you never told anyone at Amalgamated Sugar that
you didn't want to sign off on shipments of sugar
because it had sugar contaminated from the Mike
Davis accident?

A.

No.
***

Q.

Is there any occasion when you refused to sign it [the
bulk loading form]?

A.

Refused, no.

Q.

Was there any occasion in which you said to anyone
you didn't want to sign it?

A.

No.

Sparrow Depo. At 249, 250, 258 (Add. A).
Facts Material to Plaintiffs' Emotional Distress Claim
28.

Waddoups does not allege that he was injured by any "physical

aggression." Complaint TJ 47 (R. 11). Waddoups has not been disabled and has worked
since leaving Amalgamated Sugar. Waddoups Depo. at 8-20.
29.

On the day of the Mike Davis accident, Amalgamated Sugar made two

psychiatrists available at the factory to counsel employees, and Waddoups met with one
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of them. Beginning the next day, Waddoups was on a regularly scheduled 7-day break
from work. Waddoups Depo. at 217-18,134 (Add. B).
30.

Sparrow alleges that on one occasion a supervisor "slapped [him] up the

side of the head with [a] yellow notebook" and threatened to fire him for "messing up."
Sparrow does not claim that he was injured or suffered emotional distress as a result of
this incident. Sparrow Depo. at 98-99 (Add. A). Sparrow testified that he has been in
"good health" since leaving Amalgamated Sugar, except for feeling "bummed out"
because of his firing. Id. at 268-70 (Add. A).
Facts Material To Plaintiffs' Interference With Economic Relations Claim
31.

Plaintiffs are unaware of any contacts between Amalgamated Sugar and

any of their subsequent actual or potential employers. Mr. Sparrow testified:
Q.

So you don't know of any communications between
anyone at Amalgamated Sugar and any other employer
regarding you, is that correct?

A.

Correct. (Sparrow Depo. at 276-77) (Add. A).

Mr. Waddoups testified:

32.

Q.

So as far as you know, Amalgamated Sugar has not
been in contact with any of your employers since—

A.

As far as I know.

Q.

Do you know if Amalgamated Sugar has been in
contact with any of the companies you applied at?

A.

I would not know that.
(Add. B).

(Waddoups Depo. at 310)

After he was discharged, Sparrow was denied a job at Amalgamated

Sugar's "beet dump" where sugar beets are stored. Sparrow Depo. at 17, 270 (Add. A).
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Sparrow was not hired at Oreida Foods because 'they weren't hiring" and "they had
everybody they needed." Sparrow does not know of any contact between Amalgamated
Sugar and Oreida Foods regarding himself. Sparrow Depo. at 272-74 (Add. A).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

Plaintiffs were properly discharged for excessive absenteeism. They had

more than the permitted three unexcused absences. Plaintiffs presented no evidence that
the reason for their discharges was pretextual.
II.

Idaho law governs plaintiffs' claims because plaintiffs lived, worked, and

were discharged in Idaho. No events material to plaintiffs' claims occurred in Utah.
III.

Plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim fails because (i) Idaho

law does not recognize the claim with respect to employees governed by a collective
bargaining agreement and protected from discharge except for "just cause/' and
(ii) plaintiffs' claim is preempted by federal labor law because they were employed under
a collective bargaining agreement.
IV.

Plaintiffs' argument about "whistleblowing" under Utah law is inaccurate

and irrelevant. Their public policy claim was properly dismissed under Idaho and federal
law.
V.

Plaintiffs' infliction of emotional distress claim was properly dismissed

because (i) they cannot establish essential elements of the claim under Idaho law, (ii) the
claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Idaho Workmen's
Compensation Act, and (iii) the claim is preempted by federal labor law.
VI.
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Plaintiffs' interference with prospective economic advantage claim was
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properly dismissed because plaintiffs presented no facts showing Amalgamated Sugar
interfered with any actual or prospective economic relationship between either plaintiff
and any other person.
VII.

Plaintiffs' argument that their complaint did not have to refer to Idaho law

in order to state a public policy claim under Idaho law is without merit.
VIII. Plaintiffs' conspiracy claim is groundless because they present no evidence
of Amalgamated Sugar conspiring with any other person.
IX.

Plaintiffs' argument that Amalgamated Sugar misrepresented facts to the

District Court is incorrect.
X.

Plaintiffs' argument that the District Court should have granted their

motion for a continuance is without merit because they did not appeal from the District
Court's denial of their motion and because the District Court did not abuse its discretion
in denying their motion.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS WERE PROPERLY DISCHARGED FOR EXCESSIVE
ABSENTEEISM.
It is undisputed that plaintiffs' employment was subject to the rule that they could

not have more than three unexcused absences: "The maximum number of unexcused
absences you can receive before being terminated is three (3)." Facts ^f 5. Both plaintiffs
were aware of the rule. Id. Both plaintiffs had more than three unexcused absences and
were discharged for that reason. Factsffl[6-10, 13-19. Plaintiffs' public policy wrongful
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discharge claim necessarily fails because Amalgamated Sugar acted for a proper reason
consistent with its attendance policy, and plaintiffs cannot show that it was pretextual.
Plaintiffs attempt to escape from the above facts, but cannot to do so. Plaintiffs
purported to "dispute" certain facts relating to their unexcused absences, but did not "set
forth specific facts [from deposition or other testimony] showing that there [was] a
genuine issue for trial," and did not "specifically refer to those portions of the record
upon which [they] relie[d]," as required by Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. R. 446-49
(Add. D)4. For example, plaintiffs claimed that Amalgamated Sugar's rule on unexcused
absences had been applied "arbitrarily and capriciously," but provided no support for this
assertion. R. 449, 1(20 (Add. D). Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983)
("The mere assertion that an issue of fact exists without a proper evidentiary foundation
to support that assertion is insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary judgment
motion.").

Plaintiffs also examined some 12,000 pages of employee files and yet

Amalgamated Sugar presented two statements of material facts in support of its two
summary judgment motions. R. 326-3, 1030-38. Plaintiffs only attempted to counter
Amalgamated Sugar's first statement of facts. R. 445-50. Plaintiff did not dispute the
statement of facts set out by Amalgamated Sugar in support of its second motion.
R. 1053-70. Plaintiffs claim that Amalgamated Sugar's second motion is a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. PL Brief at 47. This is incorrect for the obvious reason that the motion went
beyond the pleadings and relied on facts in the record. R. 1030-38. Rule 12(c) provides
that if "matters outside the pleadings are presented to . . . the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." The
district court considered Amalgamated Sugar's second motion as a "Motion for Summary
Judgment," and "grant[ed] the motion." Minute Entry, R. 1203.
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presented no evidence of Amalgamated Sugar applying its rule on unexcused absences
differently to plaintiffs than to other employees. R. 289,291.
Plaintiffs "disputed" Sparrow's first two unexcused absences but did so without
citation to the record, and admitted that Sparrow was "assessed" unexcused absences for
the two days in question. R. 446, ^ 6 (Add. D). With respect to the final incident that
resulted in his discharge, Sparrow testified that he called in sick, went to Nevada, was
caught speeding, and then jailed for several days. Facts Tfl[ 7-8. Sparrow testified that he
had exceeded the allowable number of unexcused absences:
A.

. . . I spent three days in jail and I should have worked.
. . . I missed three days of work. That's unexcused.
. . . I knew I could be terminated for that.

Q.

You knew you could be terminated for unexcused
absences and you had enough to be terminated?

A.

Yeah. (Facts % 9.)

Despite Sparrow's testimony, plaintiffs "disputed" Sparrow's unexcused absences, but
did so only argumentatively and without citation to the record. R. 447, ^[ 10 (Add. D).
With respect to the warnings Waddoups received and his four unexcused absences,
plaintiffs admit that he received the warnings and was "assessed" the unexcused
absences, but argue either that these facts are irrelevant or that Waddoups had some
reason for his absences that the company should have credited. R. 447-49 (Add. D).
However, Waddoups did not file a grievance under the labor agreement on any of the
occasions, and Plaintiffs presented no evidence that Amalgamated Sugar "assessed"
Waddoups with unexcused absences for any retaliatory or actionable reason. Id.
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With respect to Waddoups' last unexcused absence, plaintiffs did not dispute that
Waddoups failed to show up for work, only called in four hours after his shift had begun,
and admitted that he had overslept. Facts Tf 18; R. 449, K 18 (Add. D). Waddoups
testified:

"I told him [Assistant Superintendent Larry Dayley] that I had personal

problems. I didn't know why the alarm didn't go off, but I had overslept. I had called in
sick because I wasn't feeling well." Facts ^f 18. Waddoups also stated that he was
discharged because "[he] was late and had been warned." IdL Plaintiffs purported to
dispute Waddoups' own admissions by ignoring them and quoting his testimony partially
and selectively. R. 449, % 18 (Add. D). As to the fact that Larry Dayley discharged
Waddoups for having more than three unexcused absences, plaintiffs declared that they
"disputed" this fact but offered no supporting evidence. R. 449, % 19 (Add. D).
In sum, it was undisputed at summary judgment and remains undisputed that
Amalgamated Sugar permitted no more than three unexcused absences and that plaintiffs
were discharged upon exceeding the maximum. Despite plaintiffs' claim of "pretext,"
they presented no facts supporting their contention. Consequently, their public policy
wrongful discharge claim was properly dismissed.
II.

IDAHO LAW GOVERNS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS.
Utah applies the "most significant relationship" test to determine the governing

law in a given case.
We apply the "most significant relationship" approach, as
described in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, in
determining which state's law should apply in actions
involving torts, contracts, property interests, and the like.
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Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 867 (Utah App. 1994). See also Pacheco v. Hercules,
Inc., 61 FEP Cases (BNA) 825, 826 (D. Utah 1993) (same); Doe v. Nevada Crossing,
Inc., 920 F.Supp. 164, 166 (D. Utah 1996) (same). The following factors determine
which state's law is applied:
(1)

The place where the injury occurred;

(2)

The place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;

(3)

The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties; and

(4)

The place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145.
The proper application of the above factors is illustrated by Pacheco v. Hercules.
Hercules hired the plaintiff in Utah in 1968 where he worked for 19 years, until he was
transferred to a company facility in Georgia in 1987. In Georgia, the plaintiff allegedly
was subjected to tortious misconduct by a coworker and a supervisor, suffered severe
emotional injury, and eventually lost his job. The plaintiff sued his supervisor and
Hercules based on tort and contract theories. Pacheco, 61 FEP Cases at 825. The court
determined that Georgia law governed the plaintiffs tort and contract claims:
All four factors point to Georgia. The injury occurred in
Georgia. The alleged conduct which caused the injury
occurred in Georgia. At the time of the injury, plaintiff and
defendant [supervisor] were domiciled in Georgia, and
defendant Hercules, a Delaware corporation, had a place of
business in Georgia. Finally, at the time of the injury,
plaintiffs employment relationship was centered in Georgia.
For these reasons, the court determines that Georgia law
governs plaintiffs tort claim. (Id. at 826; also 827.)
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Application of the four factors to the instant case demonstrates that Idaho law
governs plaintiffs' claims. The first factor is where the injury occurred. Plaintiffs allege
that they were "wrongfully discharged" from their jobs in Twin Falls, Idaho. Complaint
T[ ^| 6-7, 35, 37 (R. 3, 9, 10). For this alleged injury, plaintiffs seek damages for "loss of
earnings." Id. at p. 17 (R. 16). Plaintiffs' "wrongful discharge" injury occurred in Idaho.
Plaintiffs claim that they suffered emotional distress as a result of their treatment
on-the-job at the Twin Falls factory. Complaint %^ 47-50 (R. 11-13). This alleged
injury also occurred in Idaho. Finally, plaintiffs claim that Amalgamated Sugar tortiously
interfered with their prospective economic advantage by terminating them "purportedly
for cause" and thereby "hampering] their opportunity for future employment." Id. % 52
(R. 14). Plaintiffs' subsequent attempts at employment took place in Idaho. Sparrow
Depo. at 9-13; 16-17; Waddoups Depo. at 8-9; 11-20 (Add. A, B). This alleged injury
also took place in Idaho.
In response, plaintiffs argue that their "wrongful discharge" injury is not their
discharge, but "the contravention of Utah's vital state interests." PI. Brief at 19. This
argument is meritless. First, it begs the question of how Utah can have any "vital state
interests" in plaintiffs' discharges in Idaho. Plaintiffs invoke an alleged "injury suffered
by Utah's public" (id at 22), but make no attempt to show how the Utah public was
affected by plaintiffs' discharges. Second, plaintiffs are not "private attorneys general"
suing on behalf of the Utah public, but individuals suing for themselves over their alleged
wrongful discharges in Idaho. They are seeking damages for their "[lost] earnings,
emotional injuries and mental injuries." Complaint at p. 17 (R. 16). Third, in a wrongful
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discharge case, the injury is the discharge (regardless of the legal theory relied on) and
occurs where the employee was discharged. Pacheco, 61 FEP Cases at 826-27.
Plaintiffs cite Doe v. Nevada Crossing, 920 F.Supp. 164 (D. Utah 1996), in
support of their argument for the application of Utah law (PL Brief at 19), but Doe
actually demonstrates that Idaho law governs plaintiffs' claims. In Doe, the plaintiffs
asserted a claim for "breach of the spousal relationship." 920 F. Supp. at 166. The court
determined that Utah law governed this claim because the plaintiffs were "Utah residents
who are husband and wife living in Utah," "the center of [the plaintiffs' spousal]
relationship ... is in Utah" and therefore "Utah is where the damage to the relationship of
[the] plaintiffs was experienced." In contrast, the plaintiffs were in "Wendover, Nevada a
few miles from the Utah border" for "less than 24 hours." Because "Utah is the most
significant place of [the plaintiffs'] interpersonal relationship," the court concluded that
Utah law governed their claim. 920 F.Supp. at 165, 167. Similarly, because plaintiffs
worked and were discharged in Idaho, their alleged injuries occurred there.
The second factor is where the conduct causing the injury occurred. At summary
judgment, it was not disputed that Mr. Sparrow was discharged by Assistant
Superintendent Bill Stuart and that Mr. Waddoups was discharged by Assistant

5

See also Ashmore v. Northeast Pipeline, 843 F.Supp. 759, 774 (D.Me. 1994) (using the
most significant relationship test to determine the appropriate law for a wrongful
termination in violation of public policy claim, the court held that despite the fact that
plaintiff lived in another state during the term of his employment, the law of the state
where the termination occurred should apply because it was the place where both the
conduct causing the injury and the injury occurred as well as the place where the
employment relationship was negotiated and commenced and where the plaintiffs
supervisors were located).
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Superintendent Larry Dayley in Twin Falls, Idaho. R. 328,330, 447,449 (Add. C, D).
Plaintiffs now argue that Amalgamated Sugar "manages its factories from it headquarters
in Ogden" and therefore "Utah law applies to this matter." PL Brief at 23-24. No
evidence supports plaintiffs' "factory management from Utah" contention, either
generally or with respect to plaintiffs in particular. Plaintiffs merely cite to Amalgamated
Sugar's statement that its headquarters is in Utah. R. 332 (Add. C). The undisputed
evidence remains that plaintiffs were discharged by their supervisors in Twin Falls,
Idaho. In sum, the alleged injurious conduct occurred in Idaho.
The third factor is the domicile, residence, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.

Plaintiffs' resided, worked, and were discharged in Idaho.

Plaintiffs' Complaint states:
Plaintiffs, Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow, at all times
material hereto, worked and resided in the County of Twin
Falls, State of Idaho.
Facts <[j 2. The third factor supports the application of Idaho law to plaintiffs' claims.6
The fourth factor is where the relationship between the parties is centered.
Plaintiffs concede that their employment relationship with Amalgamated Sugar was
centered in Idaho, but argue that this factor is irrelevant because they are not asserting a

6

Plaintiffs allege that Waddoups' domicile is Utah because he intends to move to Utah.
PL Brief at 24. This argument fails because (i) the assertion about Waddoups' alleged
intent is without foundation in the record, and (ii) the relevant time period for Waddoups'
domicile or residence is when the events at issue occurred, i.e., when he worked and was
discharged in Idaho. Pacheco, 61 FEP Cases at 826 ("At the time of the injury, plaintiff
[was] domiciled in Georgia."). Moreover, Waddoups testified that after leaving
Amalgamated Sugar, he worked in Idaho, lived in Utah for a brief period and then
returned to Idaho where he now lives. Waddoups Depo. at 8-9; 11-20 (Add. B).
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claim based on their collective bargaining agreement.

PL Brief at 25.

Plaintiffs'

argument misses the point. The "most significant relationship" test applies regardless of
whether tort or contract claims are asserted. Records, 887 P.2d at 867. In sum, all four
factors show that Idaho has the most significant relationship to plaintiffs' claims and
therefore provides the governing law.
III.

PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A PUBLIC POLICY WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE CLAIM UNDER IDAHO LAW.
A.

Idaho Law on Public Policy Wrongful Discharge.

Idaho law recognizes a public policy wrongful discharge claim only (a) as contract
claim and (b) only in the context of at-will employment.
|T"jhis Court ("declares its] intent to classify a cause of action
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy as a
breach of contract rather than a tort. All employment
contracts terminable at will are subject to the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. A breach of the covenant is a
breach of the employment contract, and is not a tort. . . .
Similarly, a cause of action for wrongful termination of a
contract of employment at will based on a violation of public
policy is a contract cause of action . . .
Hummer v. Evans, 923 P.2d 981, 987 (Idaho 1996) (citations and internal quotations
marks omitted; emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly followed the New Hampshire Supreme
Court in recognizing a public policy wrongful discharge claim as a contract claim that
applies to at-will employment contracts.
We hold that a termination by an employer of a contract of
employment at will which [violates public policy] constitutes
a breach of the employment contract.
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Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District, 563 P.2d 54, 58 (Idaho 1977) (quoting Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974). See also Hummer, 923 P.2d at 987 (citing
Monge on same point).
It is because an at-will employment contract gives the employer complete freedom
to discharge an employee for any reason that the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized an
implied contractual restriction on the employer's freedom of action where a termination
would violate public policy. See Hummer, 923 P.2d at 986-87 (employer may terminate
at-will employment contract for any reason without incurring liability unless termination
violates public policy); Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 946, 949
(Idaho 1993) (Idaho law recognizes "an exception to employment-at-will contracts where
a discharge is for a reason contravening public policy."); Staggie v. Idaho Falls
Consolidated Hospitals, Inc., 715 P.2d 1019, 1021-22 (Idaho App. 1986) (same).
Where the employer does not have unfettered freedom to discharge an employee
and hence the freedom to violate public policy, the justification for an implied-in-law
contractual restriction (to protect public policy) is absent. The Idaho Supreme Court has
made this point clear by explaining that a "public policy" claim is an "exception to the
employment at-will doctrine" and "limits the employer's right to discharge an employee
without cause." Crea v. FMC Corp., 16 P.2d 272, 275 (Idaho 2000). Consequently,
Idaho has not recognized a public policy claim where the employee is already protected
by a "just cause" standard for termination. Id. See also Laramee v. French & Bean Co.,
830 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Vt. 1993) (at-will employees protected from terminations that
violate public policy. "That protection however is not provided to employees whose
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discharge is contractually protected by a just cause provision of a collective bargaining
agreement.")
In sum, a public policy wrongful discharge claim under Idaho law is a contract
claim based on a contractual restriction that is implied into the underlying at-will
employment contract. Idaho does not recognize a public policy wrongful discharge claim
outside the context of at-will employment.
B.

Plaintiffs Cannot State a Public Policy Wrongful Discharge Claim
Because Their Collective Bargaining Agreement Protected Them From
Discharge Except for "Just Cause."

The collective bargaining agreement that governed plaintiffs' employment with
Amalgamated Sugar protected them from termination except for "just cause'9:
The Company has the right to discipline or discharge
employees for just cause. (Facts % 4.)
Any employee disagreeing with the reason for his discharge could file a grievance and
pursue the matter to binding arbitration.

Id. While plaintiffs claim that they were

discharged '"without just cause," they did not attempt to use the grievance and arbitration
process. Id.ffl[11, 12,20,21.
Plaintiffs cannot state a claim under Idaho law for public policy wrongful
discharge. As explained above, Idaho recognizes the cause of action only in the context
of at-will employment, where the employee would otherwise have no protection from
being discharged "without cause." Plaintiffs were fully protected from being discharged
without cause. Not only did their employment contract contain a "just cause" standard
for discharge, it also provided a grievance and arbitration procedure for resolving the
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merits of disputed discharges. Facts ^ 4. In light of these contractual provisions, the
rationale for implying an additional contractual restriction into the employment contract
has no application.7

Moreover, if plaintiffs were allowed to assert a public policy

wrongful discharge claim it would mean that they could ignore their actual employment
contract and the procedures and remedies it provides, and yet assert a contract claim
based on a dispute (termination of employment) expressly covered by their actual
employment contract.
Plaintiffs suggest that Idaho law allows '"union workers to maintain a [state law
public policy] cause of action." PL Brief at 28-29 (quoting Hummer quoting another
case). This is incorrect and plaintiffs quote Hummer out of context. Hummer involved
an employee 'terminable at will" who was discharged for "compliance with a courtissued subpoena." 923 P.2d at 986-87. Plaintiffs' quotation from Hummer is from
another case that actually shows that only an at-will employee may assert a public policy
claim under Idaho law. In Watson v. Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals, Inc. (quoted in
Hummer), the plaintiff "attempted] to unionize the hospital," but was unsuccessful when
"a majority of the employees rejected the attempt to unionize the hospital." 720 P.2d
632, 633 (Idaho 1986). The plaintiff was allegedly discharged for "pro-union activities."

"[A] claim for breach of this implied covenant is necessarily based on the existence of
an underlying contractual relationship.... This cause of action developed in the
employment context to protect the job security of at-will employees who could be fired
without cause under common law. No comparable lack of job security, however,
generally exists for unionized employees, whose employment relationship is governed by
a collective bargaining agreement." Milne Employees Ass'n. v. Sun Carriers, 960 F.2d
1401,1411 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Id. at 636. On these facts, the plaintiff asserted that her discharge violated public policy.
The plaintiffs employment was never governed by a collective bargaining agreement,
nor was the plaintiff protected by a "just cause" standard for discharge. In allowing the
plaintiff to assert her public policy claim, the Idaho Supreme Court made clear that it was
recognizing the claim only in the context of at-will employment: "An employee at will
may n o t . . . be discharged for a reason contravening public policy." Id. at 634 (emphasis
added).
In sum, there is no support in Idaho law for the notion that an implied contractual
obligation not to discharge in violation of public policy should be read into plaintiffs'
collective bargaining agreement which already protected plaintiffs' employment by
permitting discharge only where there was "just cause."
IV.

PLAINTIFFS' PUBLIC POLICY CLAIM IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL
LABOR LAW.
A.

Federal Law Governing Collective Bargaining Agreements.

Claims relating to a collective bargaining agreement are governed exclusively by
federal labor law under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29U.S.C.
§ 185(a). Such claims "must be brought under § 301 and be resolved by reference to
federal law." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985). See also Textile
Workers Union of American v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957) (§ 301
vests exclusive power in "federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement
of these collective bargaining agreements."); Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025,
1027 (Utah 1987) (summarizing federal labor law).
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There are two prerequisites that must be satisfied before a breach of a collective
bargaining agreement claim (or related claim) can be brought.

First, the plaintiff-

employee must exhaust or attempt to exhaust his grievance and arbitration remedies
under the collective bargaining agreement. See Del Costello v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163 (1983) ("an employee is required to attempt to exhaust
any grievance or arbitration remedies provided in the collective-bargaining agreement.");
Sperber, 747 P.2d at 1027 (same).
Second, the plaintiff-employee must allege and prove that his union, as his agent
and representative, breached its duty of fair representation to him. Del Costello, 462 U.S.
at 165 ("To prevail against... the Company... [employee-plaintiffs] must not only
show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of
demonstrating breach of duty by the Union.") (internal quotation marks omitted;
bracketed words in original).

Because the collective bargaining agreement already

provides union employees with a remedy and a procedure for obtaining the remedy, an
employee may not go beyond the grievance and arbitration procedure (by suing in court)
unless he can demonstrate that his union made a sham of his contractual remedies.
Unless an employee proves that he has not been fairly
represented by his union under the collective bargaining
agreement, the grievance and arbitration procedures set forth
in the collective bargaining agreement are the employee's
exclusive remedy.
Sperber, 747 P.2d at 1027. See also Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 165 (same).
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act not only exclusively governs
claims for breach of collective bargaining agreements, it also preempts state-law claims
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that relate to collective bargaining agreements. Section 301 preemption arises out of the
need for federal labor law to be uniform across the country and for labor agreements to be
interpreted uniformly. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04
(1962).

Section 301 preemption is very broad because of the ease with which an

aggrieved employee otherwise could turn a breach of a collective bargaining agreement
into a state tort or contract claim and thereby obtain a state law remedy inconsistent with
the collective bargaining agreement.

Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 209-11 ('the

preemptive effect of § 301 must extend beyond suits alleging [collective bargaining
agreement] violations" to encompass state-law claims that "would frustrate the federal
labor-contract scheme established in § 301").
A broad range of state-law claims is preempted by federal labor law. See, e.g.,
Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 370-72 (1990) (wrongful death claim under Idaho
law against union, based on union's alleged negligence in conducting safety inspections,
preempted by § 301 despite fact that Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the claim had an
independent basis in state law); Park City Education Ass'n v. Board of Education,
879 P.2d 267, 273 (Utah App. 1994) (dismissal of contract claims upheld as barred by
federal labor law); Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 599 (9th
Cir. 1996) (breach of contract and breach of implied covenant claims preempted by
§ 301); Mock v. T.G.&Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1992) (emotional distress
claim preempted by §301); Jackson v. Southern California Gas Co., 881F.2d638,
644-45 (9th Cir. 1989) (implied covenant claim preempted); Herman v. Carpenters
Local 971, 60 F.3d 1375, 1385 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary dismissal of implied
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covenant claim where collective bargaining agreement prohibited terminations without
just cause). Preempted state law claims are either dismissed or may be reconsidered as if
they were pled under § 301. In the latter case, the claim must satisfy all requirements of a
§ 301 claim.

Sperber, 747 P.2d at 1027-28 (preempted state-law contract claim

reconsidered as if it were a § 301 claim, and then dismissed under § 301).
B.

Because Plaintiffs' Claim Is Based on Their Collective Bargaining
Agreement, the Claim Is Barred Under Federal Labor Law.

Under Idaho law plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim is an implied
contract claim (analogous to an implied covenant claim) based upon plaintiffs'
underlying employment contract. See Section IIIA above. Idaho recognizes a public
policy wrongful discharge claim only on the basis of an at-will employment contract. Id.
Nonetheless, if it were assumed arguendo that Idaho might recognize plaintiffs' claim in
the context of their collective bargaining agreement, the claim would be preempted by
federal labor law.

This is so because plaintiffs' claim under Idaho law asserts a

contractual restriction that is implied in plaintiffs' underlying contract, the collective
bargaining agreement.

Plaintiffs' claim is thus a claim concerning the collective

bargaining agreement.8 Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim is preempted or must comply with
the requirements of § 301.

o

A collective bargaining agreement is not limited to the four corners of the written
contract, but encompasses additional matters by implication. United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960) (terms of collective
bargaining agreement "not confined to the express provisions of the contract"); Eitmann
v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 730 F.2d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1984) (company
conduct "not explicitly covered by the collective bargaining agreement is properly within
the scope of the contractual grievance procedure"). Consequently, an implied contract
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Plaintiffs cannot satisfy any of the prerequisites to a valid claim under § 301.
First, plaintiffs did not file a grievance or attempt to use their contractual remedies under
the labor agreement. Facts ^ 12, 21. Second, plaintiffs do not allege, let alone attempt
to prove, that their union breached its duty of fair representation to them. Accordingly,
plaintiffs' claim is barred under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
C.

Even as a "Separate" Implied Contract Claim, Plaintiffs' Public Policy
Claim Is Preempted by § 301,

Alternatively, if plaintiffs' claim were characterized as a "separate" implied
contract claim apart from the collective bargaining agreement, the claim would still be
preempted.

Section 301 does not permit a separate contract (express or implied) to

coexist with a collective bargaining agreement where the purported contract would be
inconsistent with or more advantageous than the collective bargaining agreement.
Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Section 301
preempts any individual labor contract inconsistent with a collective bargaining
agreement").
A separate contract claim is inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement
if it does not require the employee to use and exhaust the grievance and arbitration

claim, like an implied covenant claim, is based on the collective bargaining agreement
itself because it is based on a provision that is implied into the labor agreement. Rissetto,
94 F.2d at 599 ("claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing is also clearly
preempted because such covenant is an implied term of [the plaintiffs] CBA").
The dependence of plaintiffs' claim on their collective bargaining agreement is
confirmed by the fact that they allege that they were discharged "without just cause" and
without an "opportunity to respond or be heard" on the reasons for their discharges.
Facts ffi[ 11, 20. Both "just cause" and the "opportunity to respond or be heard" are
provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. Facts % 4.
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process or if it can be brought after a claim under the labor agreement would be time
barred. Eitmann v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.. 730 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1984)
(implied contract claim preempted as inconsistent with collective bargaining agreement
where it would "supersede" the "contractual grievance procedure" and allow employee to
assert claim without exhausting contractual remedies).
Federal labor law does not permit inconsistent claims, such as asserted by
plaintiffs, because to do so would undermine the collective bargaining process.
Under federal labor law, only duly authorized union
representatives can bargain for the terms and conditions of
employment for those within the bargaining unit.... [Any]
separate contract must be consistent with the collective
bargaining agreement negotiated by the union.
Thus,
inconsistent separate agreements are not enforceable....
Nothing could undermine the authority of the collective
bargaining unit more thoroughly than allowing individuals or
cohorts of employees to enforce separate contracts that were
more advantageous to those employees than was the
collective bargaining agreement itself.... Accordingly, we
decline to [allow] individual agreements to undercut the
union as the bargaining agent. In the instant case, providing
any remedy under an implied contract when no remedy is
available
under
the
collective
bargaining
agreement — because the time for arbitration has
passed — obviously would put fthe plaintiff! in a more
advantageous position than Tunion] employees bound by the
collective bargaining agreement, thereby undermining the
collective bargaining unit. Consequently, [the plaintiffs]
alleged implied contract is unenforceable.
Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 970 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted;
emphasis added).
Plaintiffs' claim is inconsistent with the labor agreement governing their
employment. Plaintiffs' claim would permit them to ignore the grievance and arbitration
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process and would also permit them to bring a lawsuit well beyond the time in which a
claim could be asserted under the collective bargaining agreement. Facts <f 4. Thus,
plaintiffs' claim, even as a "separate" implied contract claim, is preempted by § 301.
D.

Plaintiffs' Attempt to Treat Their Public Policy Claim as a Tort Claim
Does Not Save It From § 301 Preemption,

Under Idaho law, plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim is "a contract
cause of action" based on their underlying labor agreement. Hummer, 923 P.2d at 987.
Plaintiffs ignore the actual nature of their claim and attempt to have it treated as if it were
a tort claim, notwithstanding Idaho law. Plaintiffs first do this by invoking Retherford
and other cases, dealing with tort claims of wrongful discharge to argue that their claim
should not be preempted.9

PI. Brief at 31-33.

Plaintiffs' reliance on tort cases is

unavailing because their claim is a contract claim.
Ignoring Idaho law, plaintiffs declare that their claim "is not a contract cause of
action" and is therefore independent of the labor agreement and involves "nonnegotiable" duties. PI. Brief at 30-33. As explained above, this argument rests entirely
on tort cases which have no application to plaintiffs' contract claim. Because plaintiffs
are asserting a contract claim, they must pursue their remedies as with any other contract
claim, i.e., in conformity with the terms of the contract and the governing law.
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act provides the exclusive cause of
action for breach of labor agreements, including their implied provisions. Rissetto, 94
9

Retherford, 844 P.2d at 959, 969-70 (independent tort claim not preempted; implied
contract claim preempted); Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 214-21 (tort claim for bad faith
handling of insurance claim preempted because related to labor agreement); Lingle v.
Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 401 (1988) (tort claim not preempted).
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F.3d at 599 ("claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing" is a claim on
the collective bargaining agreement "because such covenant is an implied term of [the]
CBA"). Plaintiffs could have pursued their claim under § 301, but chose not to do so.10
Plaintiffs cannot escape the consequences of their choice by relabeling their contract
claim as a tort claim.
Apparently recognizing that they cannot literally turn their contract claim into a
tort claim, plaintiffs attempt to obscure the issue by distancing their claim from the labor
agreement even while acknowledging that the claim is based on the labor agreement.
Plaintiffs argue that their "claims are based on Amalgamated's breach of its duties which
arose because of its contract with Plaintiffs, but the claims are not claims 4on the
contract.'" R.1062. Plaintiffs also characterize their claim as "arising because of a
contract but not being a suit on the contract." PL Brief at 30n.5. Plaintiffs' argument is
not only illogical, but also does not save their claim from preemption. Because, as
plaintiffs admit, the claim "arises" from the collective bargaining agreement, the claim is
not independent of the labor agreement and is preempted by § 301.
In Rawson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that where a state tort law claim related
to the labor agreement, the claim was preempted by § 301. This was true even though the
wrongful death claim in Rawson was only remotely connected to the labor agreement.

10

In 1998 a union employee, discharged by Amalgamated Sugar, took her case to
arbitration. She asserted retaliation and statutory claims in addition to contesting the
"just cause" of her discharge. The arbitrator considered all her claims and reinstated her.
Amalgamated Sugar (Humphreys 1998) (R. 1406). See also Eitmann, 730 F.2d at 363
(company conduct "not explicitly covered by the collective bargaining agreement is
properly within the scope of the contractual grievance procedure").
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The Idaho Supreme Court held that the claim (a wrongful death claim against the union
based on poor safety inspections) was an ordinary negligence claim that could be
resolved without reference to the labor agreement. On that basis, the Idaho Supreme
Court held that the claim was not preempted. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, even
though the elements of negligence did not require reference to the labor agreement,
because the duty of the union to make inspections "was a duty arising out of the
collective bargaining agreement." 495 U.S. at 371. Likewise, plaintiffs' claim "arose
because of [Amalgamated Sugar's] contract with Plaintiffs," i.e., the collective
bargaining agreement, and is therefore preempted.
Plaintiffs' claim is more closely tied to the collective bargaining agreement than
was the claim in Rawson. Under Idaho law, a public policy wrongful discharge claim,
like an implied covenant claim, is a claim for "breach of the employment contract."
Hummer, 923 P.2d at 987. Therefore, plaintiffs' claim, like an implied covenant claim, is
preempted by § 301. This point has been made by, among others, the Montana Supreme
Court. In Foster v. Albertson's, Inc. at 835 P.2d 720 (Mont. 1992), the plaintiff asserted
a claim for "breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" based on the
allegation that her supervisor "sexually harassed" and "discriminated" against her. Id. at
726. Even though sexual harassment and sex discrimination claims may otherwise be
analyzed independently, the Montana Supreme Court held the implied covenant claim
was preempted because it was based on the collective bargaining agreement:
[T]he appellant's breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing claim [is] preempted by § 301. Any implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
387115.1

K

context arises from the underlying contract of employment
which, here, is the collective bargaining agreement. . . .
Because an implied covenant arises from or is implied in the
collective bargaining agreement, questions involving the
existence and breach of an implied covenant necessarily
requiring placing the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement in issue. Thus, the implied covenant claim is
preempted by federal law pursuant to § 301.
Id. 835 P.2d at 726. Similarly, plaintiffs' claim is preempted because it is based on and
"arises" from the collective bargaining agreement.
Finally, plaintiffs' claim is preempted for the additional reason that Amalgamated
Sugar's defense to the claim would necessarily involve the collective bargaining
agreement.

As part of their public policy claim, plaintiffs allege that (a) they were

employed under a collective bargaining agreement, (b) Amalgamated Sugar applied its
unexcused absence policy improperly, (c) they were discharged "without just cause," and
(d) Amalgamated Sugar denied them an "opportunity to respond or be heard" on the
reasons for their discharges. Complaint ffif 5, 35-39 (R. 3, 9-10). In defending against
these allegations, Amalgamated Sugar would have to show that it applied its attendance
policy properly, did have "just cause" to terminate plaintiffs, and did not deny plaintiffs
an opportunity to be heard, all of which issues require interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement to be resolved. Facts % 4. See, e.g., Reece v. Houston Lighting &
Power Co., 79 F.3d 485, 487 (5 th Cir. 1996) (state law claim preempted where "the
interpretation of the CBA is made necessary by an employer defense"); Johnson v.
Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 1989) ("defenses, as well as claims,
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must be considered in determining whether resolution of the state law claim requires
construing the collective bargaining agreement.'5).
In sum, as an implied contract claim under Idaho law, plaintiffs' public policy
claim is preempted by Section 301. No matter how plaintiffs' claim is construed—as
based on the collective bargaining agreement, as a separate contract claim, or even as a
quasi-contract/tort claim (plaintiffs' apparent preferred characterization)—the claim is
preempted by Section 301 because it derives from the collective bargaining agreement
and because allowing the claim '"would frustrate the federal labor-contract scheme
established in § 301." Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211.
V.

PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT ABOUT
INACCURATE AND IRRELEVANT.

"WHISTLEBLOWING"

IS

Plaintiffs argue that they may state a 'Svhistleblowing" claim without reporting the
criminal conduct they allege to any public authority. PL Brief at 39-42.
misstate the law, and their argument is irrelevant.

Plaintiffs

While plaintiffs allege that

Amalgamated Sugar engaged in criminal conduct, they do not claim they "blew the
whistle" on anything but only that they 'threatened" to do so. Factsffl[23-24; PL Brief at
12. Plaintiffs never contacted any public authority about their alleged concerns, either
during or after their employment with Amalgamated Sugar.

Facts ^(24.

Whether

plaintiffs were actual or only potential "whistleblowers," their public policy claim fails
for the reasons stated above.
Additionally, the only case in which the Idaho Supreme Court permitted a
"whistleblowing" claim to withstand summary judgment concerned actual reporting of
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the alleged misconduct to the relevant public authority. Ray v. Nampa School District
No. 13L 814 P.2d 17, 21 (Idaho 1991) (public policy wrongful discharge claim stated by
at-will employee where his "employment was terminated because he had reported certain
safety code violations to the state electrical engineer"). Under Utah law (which plaintiffs
insist on invoking despite the fact that Idaho law governs their claim), a whistleblowing
claim based on criminal conduct (which plaintiffs allege here) requires that the conduct
be reported to the public authorities. In Fox v. MCI Communications, this Court ruled
that "if an employee reports a criminal violation to an employer, rather than to public
authorities, and is fired from making such reports, that does not, in our view, contravene
a clear and substantial public policy." 931 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1997). See also Ryan v.
Dan's Food Stores, 972 P.2d 395, 408 (1998) ("reporting to a public authority criminal
activity of the employer . . . brings into play a clear and substantial public policy").
Ryan also clarified the earlier Heslop v. Bank of Utah decision by explaining that while
the reporting in that case was internal, it took place after both state and federal authorities
were informed of the employer's illegal activities and the plaintiff had met with the Utah
Attorney General's office. Id. at 408 n.7.
In sum, plaintiffs' "whistleblowing" argument about Utah law is inaccurate and
does not alter the fact that their claim was properly dismissed under Idaho and federal
law.
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VI.

PLAINTIFFS' INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM IS
MERITLESS.
A.

Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Essential Elements of Their Emotional
Distress Claim.

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires the defendant to
have engaged in "very extreme" and "outrageous" conduct that "no reasonable person
could be expected to endure." Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 606 P.2d 944,
954 (Idaho 1980); Davis v. Gage, 682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Idaho App. 1984). The tort also
requires that plaintiffs have suffered "severe" and "disabling" emotional distress. This
requires more than ordinary distress, anguish or depression:
[E]vidence showing that the plaintiff was upset, embarrassed,
angered, bothered and depressed did not demonstrate a
severely disabling emotional condition adequate for
intentional infliction of emotional distress damages.
Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 464-65 (Idaho 1996) (internal
quotations omitted).
In support of their emotional distress claim, plaintiffs make the following
allegations. First, Amalgamated Sugar allegedly "failed to provide Mr. Waddoups with
psychological counseling and gamma globulin shots" provided to other employees after
the fatal accident of Mike Davis. PI. Brief at 34. This allegation is contradicted by
Waddoups' deposition testimony that Amalgamated Sugar made two psychiatrists
available at the factory on the day of the accident and that he met with one of them.
Thereafter, he was on a scheduled seven-day break. Facts «[[ 29. Second, plaintiffs claim
that Amalgamated Sugar "implied" that Waddoups, as the equipment operator, was
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responsible for the death of Mike Davis. PL Brief at 34. Plainliffs rely solely on their
complaint and provide no deposition or other evidentiary support for this allegation. Id.
Third, plaintiffs allege that an unidentified John Doe "defendant" simulated a
homosexual act with Mr. Waddoups. PL Brief at 35. This allegation is based solely on
plaintiffs9 complaint and is without support in the record. Id Additionally, because the
allegation involves an unidentified and unknown person (and not a manager, as plaintiffs
assert), it cannot be the basis of a valid claim against Amalgamated Sugar.

Id.;

Complaint ^ 47(b) (R. 11). Fourth, with respect to Sparrow, plaintiffs allege that a
supervisor "slapped [him] up the side of the head with [a] yellow notebook" and
threatened to fire him for "messing up." Sparrow does not claim that he was injured or
suffered emotional distress as the result of this incident. Facts ^[30.
As the above makes clear, plaintiffs' allegations are largely contradicted or
unsupported by the record. There is no evidence of "outrageous" conduct, as required by
the tort. Moreover, neither plaintiff suffered a "severely disabling emotional condition"
as required by Idaho law. Sparrow testified that he has been in good health, has not seen
a doctor or therapist, and was merely "bummed out" by his firing. Facts ^ 30. Likewise
there is no evidence of Waddoups suffering a disabling condition, and he has worked
since leaving Amalgamated Sugar11. Id. % 28. In sum, there is no evidence to support
essential elements of plaintiffs5 claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

11

Plaintiffs claim that the record "does not foreclose the possibility that genuine
emotional distress was . . . suffered." PL Brief at 36. Plaintiffs were obligated to present
evidence of "severe disabling" emotional distress at summary judgment, not just argue
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40

B.

Plaintiffs' Emotional Distress Claim Is Barred by the Idaho
Workmen's Compensation Act

Plaintiffs allege that Amalgamated Sugar engaged in workplace conduct that
caused them emotional injury.

This claim is not based on plaintiffs' discharges.

Complaint at ffl[ 47-50 (R. 11-14). The Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act provides
the exclusive remedy to employees for injuries arising out of employment:
[T]he liability of the employer under this [Workmen's
Compensation] law shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liability of the employer to the employee, his spouse,
dependents, heirs, legal representations or assigns.
Idaho Code § 72-209(1). The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that the statute means what it
says:
[T]he Idaho worker's compensation law provides the
exclusive remedy for injuries arising out of and in the course
of employment. . . . If the employee is unable to prove that
the injury was caused the willful or unprovoked physical
aggression of the employer, the employee will not be entitled
to damages.
Kearney v. Denker, 760 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Idaho 1988) (affirming summary dismissal of tort
claims against employer for events allegedly occurring at the workplace).12

that it is a "question of fact for the jury." Id. Plaintiffs claim that Sparrow could not look
for a job for a "month" after being fired. IdL At 37. This hardly shows a "disabling"
condition, and plaintiffs' firings are not part of their emotional distress claim. Complaint
ffi[ 46-50 (R. 12-14). Moreover, a discharge, even if wrongful, does not constitute
outrageous conduct sufficient to support an infliction of emotional distress claim.
Sperber v. Gallagher Ash Co.. 747 P.2d 1025, 1028-29 (Utah 1987) ("discharge from
employment [even for a "false reason"] does not constitute outrageous or intolerable
conduct"). Plaintiffs also claim that Waddoups suffered difficult nights because of "this
Mike Davis crap." PI. Brief at 37. Since Waddoups continued to work and was not
disabled and since his response was to the Davis fatality, this assertion is insufficient to
support plaintiffs' claim.
12

See a]so Yeend v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 659 P.2d 87, 88-90 (Idaho 1982)
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The Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act contains an exception to its exclusive
remedy provision which applies "where the injury . . . is proximately caused by the
willful or unprovoked physical aggression of the employer, its officers, servants or
employees." Idaho Code § 72-209(3).13 If any such "physical aggression" does occur in
the workplace, it "shall not be imputable to the employer unless provoked or authorized
by the employer, or the employer was a party thereto." Id.
Waddoups does not allege that he was injured by any "physical aggression." Facts
Tf28; PL Brief at 34-35. Accordingly, Waddoups' emotional distress claim does not come
within the "physical aggression" exception, and is barred by the exclusive remedy
provision of the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act.

(affirming summary dismissal of intentional tort claims as barred by the Idaho
Workmen's Compensation Act, even though the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
"intentionally and recklessly subjected the Plaintiff to severe emotional distress, pain and
suffering," and rejecting dissent's suggestion that an intentional act may not come within
the statutory definition of "accident"); Henderson v. State, 715 P.2d 978, 979 (Idaho
1986) (affirming summary dismissal of intentional tort claims asserted by discharged
employee who alleged that he had been "harassed" and mistreated on the job, which
treatment caused him mental and physical injuries. Despite the plaintiffs allegations of
intentional misconduct, his tort claims were barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act
because his injuries did not result from physical aggression); DeMoss v. City of Coeur
D'Alene, 795 P.2d 875, 877 (Idaho 1990) (affirming summairy dismissal of tort and
"assault and battery" claims based on injuries allegedly resulting from supervisor's
intentional conduct because there was no evidence of "unprovoked physical aggression").
13

The Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act bars a negligence claim because
negligent conduct does not meet the requirements of "willful or unprovoked of physical
aggression." Kearney, 760 P.2d at 1173. Plaintiffs' negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim fails for the additional reason that, under Idalio law, "For a claim of
negligent infliction of emotional distress to arise, there must be physical injury to the
plaintiff." Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 464 (Idaho 1996).
Plaintiffs make no claim of physical injury. Complaintffl[47-48 (R. 11-12).
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Sparrow alleges that on one occasion a supervisor "slapped [him] up the side of
the head with [a] yellow notebook" and threatened to fire him for "messing up." Facts
T| 30. Sparrow does not claim that he was injured or suffered emotional distress as a
result of this incident. Rather, it passed quickly with a few words between him and the
supervisor. Id. Sparrow also testified that he has been in "good health" since leaving
Amalgamated Sugar except for being "bummed out" because of his discharge. Nor has
Sparrow seen a doctor, psychologist, psychiatrist, or therapist. Id.
Even if a slap with a "yellow notebook" constitutes "physical aggression," there is
no evidence that Amalgamated Sugar "provoked or authorized" or was "a party" to the
incident, which is required by the statute. Accordingly, Sparrow's emotional distress
claim is barred by the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act.14
C.

Plaintiffs9 Emotional Distress Claim Is Preempted by Federal Labor
Law.

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act preempts emotional distress
claims based on alleged supervisory harassment which implicates the collective
bargaining agreement (governing employment and supervisory authority). Johnson v.
Beatrice Foods Co., 921 F.2d 1015, 1017-18, 1020, 1022 (10th Cir. 1990) (emotional
distress claim preempted by § 301 where plaintiff alleged that supervisor harassed,
ridiculed, and verbally abused him). Section 301 preempts tort claims whenever the
14

Although the District Court did not dismiss plaintiffs' emotional distress claim on the
basis of the Idaho Workman's Compensation Act, dismissal of the claim may be affirmed
on this additional ground because evidence for it was presented to the court. R. 335-36,
546-48 (Add.C, E). Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993)
("summary judgment [may be affirmed] on any ground available to the trial court, even if
it is one not relied on below").
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claims "implicate the exercise of supervisory authority," that is, whenever the misconduct
alleged is "misconduct under color of possible contractual authority." Only if the alleged
misconduct is "purely personal" and "does not implicate the exercise of supervisory
authority" can the

claim

escape

§ 301 preemption.

Retherford

v.

AT&T

Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 971-72 (Utah 1992). Emotional distress claims are
preempted for the additional reason that the issue of the outrageousness of the alleged
conduct cannot be resolved without reference to the labor agreement:
[A]ll aspects of [the plaintiffs] employment, including the
terms of the Collective] Bargaining] A[greement], must be
considered when evaluating whether [the employer's]
conduct was outrageous.
Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1020 (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs attempt to escape § 301 preemption by characterizing their emotional
distress claims as involving only "personal" matters. PI. Brief at 34. For conduct to be
"personal" so as to escape § 301 preemption it must be unrelated to the operation of the
workplace and concern only non-work matters. For example, a tort claim based on a
supervisor's "comments about the sexual activities of [the plaintiffs] wife" which
"escalated into a fist fight" was held not preempted.

Retherford, 844 P.2d at 972.

Plaintiffs do not allege such personal conflicts. PI. Brief at 34-35. The alleged denial of
psychological counseling (contradicted by Waddoups' testimony), the alleged "implied"
blaming of Waddoups, as the equipment operator, for Mike Davis's death, and the
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supervisor's reprimanding of Sparrow for "messing up" are not "purely personal" matters
but directly relate to the operations of the factory and the supervision of employees.
Plaintiffs' allegations clearly implicate the exercise of supervisory authority and
therefore their claim is preempted by federal labor law. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 972
(emotional distress claim based on supervisors' alleged "reprimand[ing]" the plaintiff and
threatening that she would "lose her job" preempted by federal labor law because claim
"raises questions about [the supervisors'] authority under the collective bargaining
agreement"); Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1017-18 (emotional distress claim based on
supervisor's alleged harassment, ridicule, and improper disciplining of plaintiff
preempted by § 301); Douglas v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 57273 (7th Cir. 1989) (emotional distress claim based on employer's alleged "arbitrary,"
"unjustified," and "excessive" discipline of plaintiff preempted by § 301).
In sum, plaintiffs' infliction of emotional distress claims are preempted by federal
labor law.
VII.

PLAINTIFFS' INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE
ADVANTAGE CLAIM IS GROUNDLESS.

ECONOMIC

Plaintiffs' interference with prospective economic advantage claim is groundless
because they do not identify, let alone substantiate, any conduct by Amalgamated Sugar
that interfered with any actual or potential economic relationship between either plaintiff
and any third party. Facts ^|31. Plaintiffs misstate the record in order to claim that

If the conduct were personal, plaintiffs might have claims against other individuals but
not against the Company. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 972 (emotional distress claims against
co-workers not preempted because based on their personal behavior towards plaintiff).
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Sparrow was turned down for two jobs because of Amalgamated Sugar. PL Brief at 38.
This claim is contradicted by Sparrow's deposition testimony. The first job in question
was at Amalgamated Sugar itself, specifically at its "beet dump" where sugar beets are
stored. Facts % 32. This alleged incident does not support plaintiffs' claim because a
party to a contract (actual or potential) cannot tortiously interfere with it. Orstrander v.
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 846, 850 (Idaho 1993).
The second job referred to was at Oreida Foods, about which Sparrow testified he
did not know of any contact between Oreida Foods and Amalgamated Sugar regarding
himself. Facts <f 32. Moreover, Sparrow testified that Oreida Foods told him that he was
not being hired because "they weren't hiring" and "they had everybody they needed." Id
There is no support for plaintiffs' claims about Sparrow. With respect to Waddoups,
plaintiffs do not even claim that Amalgamated Sugar interfered with any potential
employment or other opportunity. PL Brief at 38.
Plaintiffs also testified that they are unaware of any contacts between
Amalgamated Sugar and any of their subsequent actual or potential employers. Sparrow
testified:
Q.

So you don't know of any communications between
anyone at Amalgamated Sugar and any other employer
regarding you, is that correct?

A.

Correct. (Facts «f| 31.)

Waddoups testified:

387115.1

Q.

So as far as you know, Amalgamated Sugar has not
been in contact with any of your employers since —

A.

As far as I know.
A&

Q.

Do you know if Amalgamated Sugar has been in
contact with any of the companies you applied at?

A.

I would not know that. (Facts ^31.)

Plaintiffs' final argument is that Amalgamated Sugar interfered with their
prospective economic relations by falsely discharging them for "just cause." PI. Brief at
38. There is no merit for this argument.

A party must actually interfere with the

relationship between a plaintiff and a third party to be liable for tortuous interference with
economic relations. Idaho Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 824 P.2d 841, 860-61
(Idaho 1991). Mere discharge is not sufficient to state a claim. Plaintiffs also present no
evidence that their being fired for cause prevented them from obtaining any job. PL Brief
at 38. Finally, plaintiffs' argument would make their claim preempted by § 301 because
it would require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement to determine
whether they were discharged with or without "just cause." In sum, there is no basis for
plaintiffs' interference with prospective economic advantage claim.
VIII. PLAINTIFFS' ORIGINAL COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE A CLAIM
UNDER IDAHO LAW AND WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED.
Plaintiffs argue that their original complaint did not have to refer to Idaho law to
state a public policy claim under Idaho law. PL Brief at 42-44. Plaintiffs' argument is
both unclear and pointless. Plaintiffs' original complaint expressly asserted a public
policy claim on the basis of Utah law. Complaintffi[39-41 (R. 10). After the District
Court dismissed the claim, plaintiffs were given leave to replead their claim under Idaho
law, which they did.

R. 919 (Add. F); Amended Complaint Hf 39-41 (R. 1006).

Plaintiffs fail to show any error in the District Court's action.
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IX.

PLAINTIFFS' CONSPIRACY CLAIM IS GROUNDLESS.
Plaintiffs allege that "each of [unnamed] defendants" acted "in the course and

scope of its agency with its principal" and that unnamed "[defendants conspired to
terminate the employment of plaintiffs." Complaint ffi[3, 56 (R. 2, 14). Amalgamated
Sugar is the only named defendant. Plaintiffs9 presented no evidence of Amalgamated
Sugar conspiring with any other person, and admitted that they had "not identified [any]
co-conspirators." R. 480 (Add. D). Amalgamated Sugar cannot conspire with itself, and
an agent cannot conspire with its principal. Ostrander, 851 P.2d at 948 ("the actions of
an agent are the actions of the corporation"). Given that plaintiffs provide no evidence to
support their claim (PI. Brief at 45) and do not allege conduct by anyone other than
Amalgamated Sugar, their conspiracy claim is groundless and was properly dismissed.
X.

THE RECORD WAS NOT MISREPRESENTED TO THE DISTRICT
COURT.
Plaintiffs' assertion that certain facts were misrepresented to the District Court is

incorrect.

PL Brief at 46-49.

First, as to Waddoups' statement (PL Brief at 46),

Amalgamated Sugar merely quoted from his deposition testimony (quoted above in Facts
U 26). Second, as to case authority cited by plaintiffs regarding unionized employees (PL
Brief at 47), Amalgamated Sugar correctly stated that plaintiffs had cited only one case
(Watson) even tangentially dealing with the issue. R. 1057, 1184. See also p. 26-27
above. Third, regarding Amalgamated Sugar's second summary judgment motion (PL
Brief at 47), see footnote 4 above.
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Fourth, with respect to the issue of whether unionized employees under a labor
agreement can assert a separate state law contract claim, plaintiffs mischaracterized the
issue by citing Retherford's discussion of a tort claim. PI. Brief at 48. Fifth and sixth,
plaintiffs argue that they claimed that they were discharged for refusing to violate the
law. PI. Brief at 48-49. At summary judgment plaintiffs presented no evidence to
support this contention. It is undisputed that plaintiffs were "bulk loaders," responsible
for loading sugar in rail cars. They did not determine the purity of sugar, and did not
certify or in any way validate the condition of sugar. They did not determine where the
sugar was shipped or whether it was intended for human or animal consumption.
Plaintiffs merely loaded rail cars with sugar, and filled out forms indicating that the cars
were loaded and that the car openings were closed and sealed. Facts f 27. Plaintiffs
presented no evidence that they were asked to violate any law, ever refused to violate a
law, or were discharged for any such alleged refusal. R. 445-50, 1058-64. Given the
total absence of evidence supporting plaintiffs' "refusal to violate the law" contention,
plaintiffs' case remains as they have described it: "This case involves the wrongful
termination of Plaintiffs by Defendant. . . after plaintiffs threatened to 'blow the whistle'
on Defendant's [alleged] improper conduct
XI.

" PI. Brief at 12.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE.
Plaintiffs argue that the District Court should have given them a continuance to do

more discovery instead of granting Amalgamated Sugar's first summary judgment
motion. PI. Brief at 50. Plaintiffs did not appeal the District Court's ruling denying their
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motion for a continuance. R. 993. The standard of review for denial of a motion for a
continuance is abuse of discretion. Crossland Savings v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243
(Utah 1994).
At the time summary judgment was granted, more than three years had passed
since plaintiffs' complaint was filed, Amalgamated Sugar had answered interrogatories,
had responded to document requests, and had made over 12,000 pages of employee files
available to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had taken no depositions, no discovery was pending
when summary judgment was granted, and no discovery requests accompanied plaintiffs'
motion for a continuance. R. 1, 289, 291, 482-88, 918-21. The District Court did not
abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion and finding that plaintiffs "had
sufficient time, opportunity and cooperation in conducting their discovery." R. 993.
Crossland Savings, 877 P.2d at 1243-44 (no abuse of discretion where only 4 months
separated filing of complaint and summary judgment motion, no discovery was attempted
after summary judgment motion was filed, and no discovery request accompanied
Rule 56(f) motion).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the district court's summary
dismissal of plaintiffs' claims.
DATED t l > ^ V day of March, 200K

W.MAR&GAVRE'
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee
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I hereby certify that on this rxA day of March, 2001,1 caused to be mailed, fir
class, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF TH
APPELLEE, to:
Trent J. Waddoups
CARR & WADDOUPS
8 East Broadway, Suite 609
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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